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An important dimension of contemporary American urban politics involves the redis­
tributive role o f local government. Activism at the local level has produced electoral 
movements that have succeeded in electing progressive local candidates and coalitions, 
yet on assuming office those officials face tremendous obstacles in meeting the expecta­
tions of those who put them in office. From 1991 to 1993 in Hartford, Connecticut, 
an attempt at progressive governance by a multiracial coalition was fraught with diffi­
culties. Tensions among progressives and among leadership from impoverished commu­
nities of color, responses of downtown interests and the media, fiscal crises and the 
unrelenting needs o f the population, served to complicate or stymie redistributive efforts 
and led to electoral defeat. However, new mechanisms for popular participation and 
several other reform measures were accomplished.
I n recent years, as social movements reflecting the needs of urban populations assert themselves through local politics, this activism reveals a number of dilemmas 
of American urban politics, A host of issues is presented when activists, variously 
described as urban populist or progressive regimes,1 assume state and local public 
offices. Particularly in distressed cities, the combined problems of fiscal stress, tax base 
erosion, racial isolation, and lack of state and federal support make for a knotty collec­
tion of issues confronting new officeholders. Because cities are where huge social ques­
tions of race, class, gender, inequality, and social policy converge and many facets of 
struggles over the outcome of political and economic change are played out, the manner 
of local governing takes on increasing significance. What city governments do in such 
areas as education, administration of local welfare programs, treatment of indigent and 
marginalized populations, provision of alternatives for youth, and the tenor of police- 
community relations all involve choices that seriously affect the quality of everyday liv­
ing. These redistributional and social consumption issues animate vital social move­
ments in urban areas in which the local state has a significant mitigating role.
For reform-oriented or progressive regimes, especially those which attempt to 
advance the interests of impoverished communities of color, these issues take on large 
proportions and present stunning dilemmas. Officeholders face a variety of challenges 
ranging from holding political coalitions together, to dealing with traditional interest 
groups — including powerful and sometimes antagonistic downtown business interests
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— to attempting whatever redistributive measures are available for local government, to 
managing the city’s finances, to carrying out routine service delivery, and more. They 
must strike a balance among competing priorities, even of those constituencies to whom 
they feel most responsible.
Once the decision is made to participate in electoral politics — to participate in “the 
system” — one’s expectations of the possibility of reform need to be defined or 
acknowledged. The problem for many progressives is whether and how to engage in 
such redistributive ventures as equity planning2 in light of the understanding that class 
and race divisions are endemic to the larger social order in America. These questions are 
sometimes posed as either/or dilemmas:3 either one operates outside the existing politi­
cal system and remains pure or within the political system that one acknowledges as 
inherently inequitable and thus becomes complicit in perpetuating the inequality. Yet 
another way to frame the problem is one in which the actual praxis evolves and reveals 
the opportunities for reform, creating openings for progressives to play a role.
Hartford’s Background and Recent Political History
Hartford, Connecticut, is one the most dramatic examples of modem urban misfortunes 
in the United States. Within its inelastic borders4 is a population with tremendous needs. 
Ranked the fourth poorest city in the country in 1980 based on percentage of population 
under the federal population (25.2%), by 1990 it ranked as the eighth poorest city, even 
as the percentage of population in poverty actually increased (27.5%).’ While it is the 
capital city of the state with the consistently highest per capita income in the country, 
Hartford is Connecticut's poorest city. It also has the nation's second highest rate of 
children living in poverty, more than 39 percent.6 Every modem urban problem can be 
found in Hartford: third world-level infant mortality rates high levels of teenage preg­
nancy; inadequate housing; soaring crime rate; drug trafficking; lethal gang activity; a 
tragically high incidence of AIDS; racial segregation and isolation within the city’s edu­
cational system.
The poverty within the city combines with racial segregation to produce remarkable 
social cleavage in the Hartford area. Affluent suburbs with a much different composition 
surround Hartford. While Hartford’s 1990 population was 36 percent African-American 
and 32 percent Hispanic, the neighboring thirty-seven towns in the Hartford Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) were more than 92 percent white. Hartford houses 
18 percent of the 768,000 people who live in the metropolitan area, yet it is home to 65 
percent of the area’s African-American population and 76 percent of its Hispanic popu­
lation.7 White households in the region enjoyed an average income of S24.749 in 1980, 
while black household incomes averaged S15,812 and Hispanics S12.694.“ By 1990 
more than 92 percent of the 27,000 public school students in Hartford were African- 
American, Hispanic, or other minorities and a landmark school desegregation suit was 
fried to address this segregation.
The capital of Connecticut has high levels of government-sector employment and is 
still considered a major insurance center with large concentrations of employment in 
this industry. Aetna, Travelers, and other insurance companies maintain significant pres­
ence in Hartford, and the defense giant United Technologies has its corporate headquar­
ters in downtown Hartford. These industries have spawned a host of services and suppli­
ers in the city and the larger Hartford region. While the city’s business community is 
quite sophisticated and highly organized, there is incredible social distance between the
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corporate officers who commute into these headquarters and the people who populate 
Hartford’s neighborhoods.
Hartford’s recent political history reflects both the growing political organization of 
the city’s African-American and Puerto Rican communities and the increasing needs and 
claims of the population on a fragmented city government. The structure of municipal 
government is an odd hybrid of reform and tradition, including a nine-member city 
council elected at-large — with three seats reserved, per state statute, for a minority 
party; a city manager as the city’s chief administrative officer who is selected — or dis­
missed — by the city council; and a popularly elected mayor whose position is visible 
but lacking in authority.
Registered Democrats solidly outnumber registered Republicans: Hartford voters 
went for Democratic presidential candidates in all presidential elections in the last sever­
al decades and voted resoundingly for Jesse Jackson in the 1984 and 1988 presidential 
primaries and for Jerry Brown in that of 1992. Given this intense identification with the 
Democratic Party within the city’s population, intraparty divisions and contests are 
intense political battles within Hartford. Like Ira Katznelson’s depiction of them in New 
York City, the factions of Hartford’s Democratic Party tend to organize around race, eth­
nicity, and territoriality.9 These bases of organization, in turn, largely reflect the city’s 
racial housing patterns.
Within City Hall, city council leadership and voting blocs are key to policy develop­
ment in Hartford. Six Democrats are routinely elected to the council and usually control 
the city’s policy agenda. However, the city manager, who has wide discretion in carry­
ing out policy initiatives, particularly in budgetary matters, is the individual to whom 
city departments are accountable. Within this structure, there is a certain ambiguity of 
accountability that is quite apparent to the citizenry. Individuals and community organi­
zations sometimes take their concerns to council members, at other times call on the city 
manager or go to see the mayor.
Council leadership is an important element of Hartford politics. Nicholas Carbone, 
celebrated as a “progressive” policy leader by Pierre Clavel,10 set the tone for Hartford’s 
city government during the 1970s. Carbone is credited with elevating the position of 
deputy mayor on the council and with forging public-private partnerships in Hartford 
during the seventies. However, by 1979 his political hold was unraveling and Carbone 
was defeated in a bitter Democratic primary.
During the 1980s, the Hartford African-American community made important politi­
cal gains. In 1981 Thirman Milner became the first popularly elected African-American 
mayor in all of New England and served until 1987. That year Carrie Saxon Perry, an 
African-American woman and multiterm state representative, sought election and won, 
drawing national attention as the first African-American woman to be elected mayor of 
a major city. But in 1993, a white South End political operative, Michael Peters, after 
losing a September Democratic primary to her, wrested the mayoralty away from Perry, 
winning the November election by running as an independent.
The Puerto Rican community also began to realize its political potential during the 
1980s, particularly after the formation in the mid-eighties of the Puerto Rican Political 
Action Committee (PAC), which brought together a number of elements of leadership in 
the Puerto Rican community. The PAC was active in the 1987 municipal elections and 
in the 1988 elections for the Connecticut legislature in which Hartford’s first two Puerto 
Rican legislators were elected.
In 1987, a new entity entered the political arena in Hartford. People for Change
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(PFC) constituted itself as a combination third party and community coalition.11 The 
group emerged from a linkage battle waged when community organizations pressed for 
taxation on downtown development to benefit the neighborhoods, and from dissatisfac­
tion by labor unions over the city’s response in a lengthy strike at Colt Firearms. Other 
key forces included the Puerto Rican PAC and women’s and gay rights organizations. 
PFC ran a slate of three individuals for the three city council seats reserved for a minori­
ty party in the November 1987 general election and captured two seats. They hoped to 
forge an alliance with other council members to pursue a reform agenda and were aided 
in their electoral quest by disaffected Democrats and the technical assistance of the 
Legislative Electoral Action Program (LEAP), an organization formed in the early 1980s 
to provide technical assistance to progressive candidates.12 PFC was also the inspiration 
for one of the successful Puerto Rican candidates for state representative in 1988.
The 1987 PFC slate included an African-American woman neighborhood leader and 
a Puerto Rican community activist, both of whom were elected, and a third, white, can­
didate who lost his bid. In 1989, after the incumbent woman decided to run with the 
Democratic Party slate and fell in step with a closely controlled Democratic caucus, 
another African-American woman, a social worker who served on the board of educa­
tion and Hartford’s first openly gay candidate, ran with the incumbent Eugenio Caro. 
Again, the two candidates of color won while the openly gay candidate lost. One lone 
Republican remained on the council until 1991, when the entire PFC slate, including 
me, successfully sought office.
In 1991, after two years of escalating tensions with the Democratic city council 
members, mayor Carrie Saxon Perry decided to assemble a council slate to challenge 
the entire set of six Democratic incumbents. It included two African-Americans, two 
Puerto Ricans, and two whites, a significant shift in power toward the Puerto Rican 
community as previous Democratic council slates had included only one Puerto Rican 
candidate. People for Change agreed to support her effort in a September primary in 
exchange for support for the three-person PFC slate in November, and an intense and 
emotional campaign brought her and her supporters an overwhelming victory. However, 
the tenuous effort at coalition politics effectively broke down during the 1991-1993 
council term, resulting in a tumultuous 1993 election season.
Besides the 1993 victory of independent candidate Peters for mayor, the election pro­
duced a city council consisting of four of the six council candidates on the Perry slate 
and two from another slate, including Eugenio Caro, who had left PFC to seek election 
as a Democrat. The November election saw the emergence of a fusion slate consisting 
of three Republicans and the two non-Perry Democrats, who, in turn, backed Michael 
Peters in his independent bid for mayor. All three PFC candidates, of whom I was one, 
lost. The four Democrats who had run with Perry and survived the primary were also 
elected, but effectively became the “minority” caucus on the council. The direction of 
the council shifted sharply: the five-person fusion bloc elected a conservative 
Republican as the majority leader and Caro as deputy mayor, a role that would become 
largely ceremonial. Any progressive thrust of the 1991-1993 council was abruptly halt­
ed, and a new urban conservatism took hold of Hartford City Hall.
The Experience of Holding Office
At the outset of holding office, I was wary of how limited and constrained city govern­
ments are: existing literature and my own research lent credence to these arguments. I
100
was convinced that cities have relatively little independence in a larger political econo­
my in which private-sector actions largely influence a local economy, a fairly economic 
determinist view. I envisioned my role as advocating for any reforms that could be eked 
out of the situation, hoped I could illuminate some of the major issues and contradic­
tions for constituents, but did not think that many substantial improvements in people’s 
lives could be won at the City Hall level. I was somewhat apprehensive that many ques­
tions — traffic patterns, zoning, and the like — would be uninteresting. I believed 
municipal government had little power at its disposal and basically functioned as flack 
catcher for the entire economic system and that making a more important difference is 
possible only at higher levels of government where more far-reaching decisions are 
reached. Yet I did feel that City Hall was sufficiently important to warrant my participa­
tion and was prepared to work hard in my new role.
I am now thoroughly convinced that cities have very little control over their econom­
ic destinies, but that municipal government is indeed an important arena of policy devel­
opment, that it has a great deal to do with how people experience everyday life, even if 
its powers are greatly constrained. I offer as proof some of the policy initiatives of our 
successors who have a much different philosophy: redefining priorities and shifting 
Community Development Block Grant funds away from human services into vaguely 
defined economic development areas; privatizing a city-run child health clinic; support­
ing the privatizing of the entire school system by the board of education; opposing a 
soup kitchen being located in a downtown church basement and rooms being made 
available for recovering substance abusers in a downtown hotel — actions that would 
not have been contemplated by the council on which I served, however divided it might 
have been.
In devising and implementing local policy consistent with what Norman Krumholz 
and Pierre Clavel identified as the thrusts of progressive regimes'3 — redistribution and 
participation — we faced enormous challenges that served to complicate or thwart our 
efforts: the opposing interests, particularly the business and downtown interests; internal 
dissension; unrelenting needs of the population; fragmented government structures; and 
our own mistakes. We did succeed in creating a more inclusive local government and 
opened new avenues of participation, thereby raising popular expectations and, in my 
view, encountering the types of problems associated with disappointing those expecta­
tions. Moreover, that disappointment, felt both by those of us in office who were com­
mitted to a progressive agenda and by many sectors of the population, ultimately con­
tributed to electoral defeat.
Tensions within the Progressive Coalition
Progressive coalitions do not work in any automatic sense. Even in coalitions whose 
partners share similar ideologies and assessments, agreement on courses of action must 
be carefully forged to ensure unity. In our case, with varying perspectives among the 
officeholders, unity proved elusive. Yet in order to pursue redistributive policies that in 
all probability would generate controversy, unity would have been required among the 
officeholders. The difficulties were endemic from the start: the basis for the 1991 
Democratic primary slate and later the People for Change campaign was an anti-incum­
bent sentiment with different actors and groups signing on for very different reasons and 
with very distinct assumptions and purposes. All the major forces in the coalition 
wanted a more inclusive and responsive local government: the African-American com­
munity, the Puerto Rican community, the South End group composed mainly of Italian
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small-business people, and progressives from the fields of labor, human services, and 
education.
Although the campaign generated immense energy and hopefulness, there was only a 
thin degree of unity among the nine council candidates, a weakness that was to be easily 
exploited by the effort’s detractors. Each candidate came to the effort with different per­
sonal constituencies and agendas that could be synchronized for purposes of the cam­
paign: the various ethnic and racial leaders who all felt shut out of City Hall could coa­
lesce around particular candidates, while the progressive activists from labor and other 
organizations could focus on PFC. When the Hanford Courant gave its endorsements in 
the primary race only to several members and not the entire slate, individual rivalries 
and divisiveness began.
The unity of the coalition was broken essentially by three factors: individual agendas 
and quests for power; ideological differences; tensions between African-American and 
Puerto Rican political leaders and how they perceived their community’s aspirations. 
Depending on where one sat, one or another of these factors was more salient. Even 
within PFC there were different perspectives over whether this was primarily an issue of 
ethnic succession among communities of color or a progressive/pro-corporate split.
Some viewed it as the former, while I viewed it as the latter, with the business interests 
able to take advantage of ethnic and racial tensions in order to defeat a regime they per­
ceived as too radical.
Individual Quests for Power and Ideological Differences. For roughly eight months, 
Mayor Perry was able to assert leadership in the coalition. A progressive agenda was 
being melded in fits and starts. During this time, however, the business community 
began to court several council members, rifts began to simmer among African-American 
and Puerto Rican political leadership, and critical issues were coming before the coun­
cil. A search for a city manager was started.
Eventually, as the title of Chinua Achebe's novel states, things fell apart.14 The mayor 
and council had implemented a system of rotating the position of deputy mayor in the 
beginning of the term in order to avoid a divisive internal election early in our tenure.
As July 1992 neared, and the necessity to choose a permanent deputy mayor loomed, 
jockeying for the position had intensified and one council member, an upwardly mobile 
African-American woman, was pressuring several colleagues vigorously for their sup­
port. She had begun to clash with Mayor Perry and became aligned with the Chamber of 
Commerce. The key point at which the coalition fell apart occurred when she was able 
to coalesce a majority of five members —she herself and four others — to elect her 
deputy mayor.
The ideological differences among the officeholders were not initially a serious 
basis of division, but they became more salient over time as the personal animosities 
deepened and ideological divergences could be used by members of the council to justi­
fy particular positions on issues. Moreover, the downtown business interests could 
exploit ideological differences in their efforts to develop loyalty among several council 
members.
This division produced a situation in which Howard Stanback, the city manager, was 
a Perry ally, affording her and her council allies access to the city administration, while 
the corporation counsel became allied with and helped to buttress the five-person major­
ity. Council meetings became long, drawn-out debates — characterized by the local 
media as bickering — thereby trivializing some of the major ideological or program­
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matic disparities between the two factions. On occasion the manager might offer a pro­
posal, only to be blocked by the corporation counsel.
Another key factor in the coalition’s not holding together was its lack of program­
matic preparation for taking over the reigns of government and its inability to move 
swiftly to implement policies. Since all six Democratic council members and I were 
novices, and there was more consensus between the Democratic challengers and People 
for Change about ousting the prior regime than about what a new approach to gover­
nance would resemble, a great deal of time had to be spent after the election and on 
assuming office acclimating new officeholders. Moreover, there was no prior agreement 
on specific projects to be undertaken once everyone was swom into office. Many initia­
tives had to await the arrival of Howard Stanback, whose experience and philosophy fit 
with the coalition. He was unable to relocate until June of 1992, a difficult time frame 
for a fragile coalition to endure. The council first asked an incumbent, more conserva­
tive city manager, Raymond Eugene Shipman, to leave, then appointed as interim city 
manager a veteran attorney in the corporation counsel’s office who was close to retire­
ment. During the time the search was conducted for the permanent manager — although 
it is truly an oxymoron to describe the Hartford city manager’s position as permanent ■— 
political divisions began to fester. When Stanback arrived, controversy was already sim­
mering despite his competence and experience.
Tensions Under the Rainbow: What I label tensions under the rainbow cannot be under­
estimated in terms of how they may serve to detract from more redistributive efforts. 
During the term, these tensions manifested as a contest between the generation of 
African-American political leaders who had finally achieved a measure of political suc­
cess in Hartford with certain limited opportunities to create patronage and the newly 
emerging Puerto Rican political leadership who were anxious to “deliver” to their com­
munity. This type of contest over remaining opportunities for patronage, however limit­
ed, can easily intensify and poses a most significant obstacle to overcome in multiracial 
electoral endeavors, despite the similar needs and conditions in the respective communi­
ties.
African-Americans and Puerto Ricans defy the conventional ethnic succession model 
in which political incorporation eventually affords an ethnic community the ability to 
assimilate and move out of a central city to an ethnically diffused, suburban existence.15 
Few such opportunities are available to Hartford’s African-Americans and especially to 
its Puerto Rican residents, although several suburbs now have growing numbers of those 
two ethnic groups. Indeed, at the core of the debate surrounding the notion of the under­
class is the issue of the persistent lack of opportunity for African-Americans, Puerto 
Ricans, and other communities of color. Therefore, even as constrained as the patronage 
opportunities might be, any openings created through political participation and organi­
zation are coveted and can become the object of rivalry between the two communities. 
Although the greatest beneficiaries of such political patronage are the middle class and 
professional segments of the communities of color, these plums can become symbolical­
ly important to the communities.
In our term, one such dispute arose soon after Howard Stanback took office, when he 
attempted to hire an African-American consultant to do a study of the management 
information capacity and requirements of city departments. The effort was thwarted 
when one of the Puerto Rican city council members who had previously endorsed the 
project changed his position to one of open opposition and eventually garnered suffi­
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cient votes to halt the entire project. Economic development loan funds available to 
small businesses in the city likewise generated similar controversies and broke the coali­
tion’s unity.
Redistributive Efforts
There are extremely limited means available for redistributive efforts at the local level. 
Moreover, any measures an urban regime attempts with respect to redistribution elicit 
reactions from a variety of constituencies, thereby provoking another key component of 
a battle over a city hall. Given the context of urban crisis and decay in the United States, 
this redistributional role of local government and the controversies inherent in such a 
role deserve attention and analysis. In our case, the relative emphasis within the 
Hartford coalition on redistributional policies became a focal point of opposition, illus­
trating a dimension of urban politics that is more than a battle over land use and the 
terms of fostering of a growth machine,16 as urban politics are typically described. For 
urban populists, for a black urban regime, for progressive activists, and for affected 
impoverished communities, alleviating poverty and providing support to those in need 
are fundamental motivations for even participating in the electoral arena.17 Despite all 
the constraining factors in the attempt to foster social change through a city hall, there 
are vastly different approaches to local governance, especially in this area.
Controversies over redistributional goals might be characterized as an inevitable 
consequence of the clash of competing imperatives facing officeholders suggested by 
Martin Shefter.18 Alternatively, they may be viewed in a manner suggested by David 
Harvey as one facet of the experimentation involved in flexible accumulation strategies 
of capital — a contingent local response to structural change — in which the relative 
strength of social movements has great influence over the outcome.19 Regardless, the 
choices available at city hall have significance in how everyday life is experienced. 
Hartford’s pressing social needs, particularly in the two key areas of education and wel­
fare, and the reaction of the business community to redistributive efforts, exemplified 
in the case of a local debate on health care reform, depict some of these controversies.
Social Needs Among the Population. A consistent issue for mayors of color, especially a 
city’s first mayor of color, and for urban populists or progressives, is the problem of 
raised expectations among constituents that everyday life will improve. In Hartford, a 
small city with the extensive poverty noted earlier, this was certainly the case. The 
resources at the disposal of City Hall to deal with such poverty are largely inadequate, 
although it is clear that local government has a role to play in addressing inequality.
Two important areas illustrate this dilemma.
Education: Hartford’s heavy reliance on property taxes to raise local revenue juxta­
posed against a school system overburdened by attempts to educate the poorest children 
in the region has produced a crisis-ridden education system. During the first year of the 
council term, a protracted set of negotiations between the teachers union and the board 
of education produced a contract settlement that the council had to ratify. The contract, 
which came under heavy criticism by the media, various political leaders, and a parent 
group, was characterized as too generous to the teachers in light of the city’s dire bud­
getary straits. The majority of council members approved the contract, given that 
through the terms of the agreement certain costly arbitration awards were dropped by 
the teachers and incentives for early retirement were created. Leaders in the teachers 
union had been a vital part of the winning coalition, a fact that was seized on by the 
forces opposing the settlement.
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As budget deliberations unfolded during each of the term's two years, huge deficits 
were faced: S17 million in the first year and S30 million in the second within an overall 
budget of between $430 million and $440 million. In Hartford’s system, the city council 
adopts a budget that includes the board of education’s allocation, an amount generally 
less than that requested by the board in an often highly publicized request. The funds 
appropriated to the board account for close to half the operating budget outright and 
there are additional costs associated with education that are absorbed in other portions 
of the city’s budget. Yet there is generally a great deal of tension over how much the 
city allocates to the board, and the two bodies often engage in a public rhetorical 
slugfest over how much the city can afford, what with all the other services it must 
fund, versus what it should devote to education. For a progressive on the council side 
of the dilemma, it ranks as a worst nightmare.
A highly vocal parent group that emerged from a South End neo-Alinsky organiza­
tion pressured the council for more education funds.20 It was especially tenacious during 
the second year of the term in lobbying for several million more dollars than the council 
had adopted. The group demanded the attendance of the mayor and council members 
at many meetings, hounded the city manager, and continued coercion until they received 
a commitment of allocation funds as they could be identified during the course of the 
fiscal year. When the regime changed, the new incumbents reneged on that pledge.
Many of the parents in this group were also active in Peters’s 1993 campaign, sup­
ported the Republicans and their conservative thrust for the council — it was the Re­
publican leadership that decided not to fulfill the promised funds for education during 
the portion of fiscal year 1995 when they assumed office — and became ardent sup­
porters of a plan to privatize the management of the schools, the first time such an 
extensive privatization plan has been attempted.
Welfare: Hartford’s population includes a large number of families and individuals on 
public assistance. As noted earlier, over 27 percent of the city’s population lives below 
the poverty line, and large numbers of working residents constitute the working poor. 
Hartford has the largest general assistance (GA) caseload in Connecticut, usually some 
one-third of the state’s entire GA population. Social services available in Hartford gen­
erally are not replicated in suburban towns in the region so that people in need of those 
services leave their towns of origin and find refuge in Hartford’s network of shelters and 
sendees.
We attempted to deal with the issue of welfare by asserting ourselves in the debate 
at the state legislature over changes and reforms to the welfare system and by attempt­
ing certain innovations in mental health services and job training for clients. When 
the legislature enacted a law that allowed cities to limit the receipt of general assistance 
to nine months, Hartford opted not to institute the provision because such a move would 
create huge disruption in the lives of the recipients as well as certain unrest. Moreover, 
in 1992, when the legislature considered ending general assistance for so-called em­
ployables, the elected officials testified at the legislature against the proposal. In addi­
tion, the council voted to approve a tent city overnight demonstration by GA recipients 
in a major downtown park as a protest, despite the opposition of downtown businesses 
to the event. By its vote, the city council agreed to waive requirements for insurance 
coverage for the demonstration and assume liability, along with other fees that are 
routinely assessed — but often waived wholly or in part — for organizations that plan 
events in city facilities and parks. Council members who were disposed to vote against 
such measures were informed by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union that it would
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seek an injunction against the city if it attempted to bar the demonstration.
Elements of the local media criticized these actions as too permissive and not strict 
enough with welfare recipients. They are in stark contrast to the actions of the majority 
of the succeeding council and mayor, who came out against a move and expansion of a 
soup kitchen operated by Catholic nuns from a building just north of the major business 
district into a downtown church basement across the street from the Civic Center. That 
leadership also supported a controversial position of the archbishop of the Hartford 
archdiocese, who blocked the proposed move. Later, the same officials opposed the use 
of several floors of a financially failing downtown hotel as housing for independently 
functioning recovering substance abusers. The hotel later closed after a good deal of 
controversy over the stance of the city officials, who also enacted a moratorium on any 
local social service expansion.
Reaction from the Business Community and Health Care Reform. The members of the 
1989-1991 city council and their 1991 mayoral candidate received a great deal of back­
ing from the business community. However, with an entirely new group of Democrats 
and a greater role for People for Change in that term, business interests had to readjust. 
One important episode involved the debate on health care reform in early 1992, a clear 
illustration of a redistributional controversy.
Health care reform had been a priority in the platforms of both the Perry slate and the 
PFC and became part of the council agenda in an effort to begin to implement the plat­
form. This issue was included before the nomination of Bill Clinton for president, 
before the concept of managed competition emerged, and before any serious prospect of 
action by Congress was contemplated. It was being considered while the major debate 
on the issue was between advocates of the single payer Canadian-style plan and the pay 
or play alternative. Moreover, it was taking place in the city known as the insurance 
capital of the world, nicknamed the insurance city, where Aetna and Travelers Insurance 
companies are the largest taxpayers and active in many facets of community life. So as 
the council considered a resolution that in its original form essentially endorsed the sin­
gle payer plan, the insurance companies, to coin a phrase, went ballistic.
I chaired the council committee before which the resolution was debated and was 
told by an Aetna government relations official that passage of the resolution would be 
considered a hostile act by the city council. Even though the resolution was primarily 
symbolic, the insurance companies took it very seriously. Insurance company employees 
were mobilized to testify at council hearings, a most atypical occurrence. One of them 
stated that the Hartford city council’s endorsement of health care reform would be like 
Detroit’s city council endorsing the relaxation of car import restrictions. Congress- 
woman Barbara Kennelly of Connecticut’s first congressional district was enlisted to 
call me at my home to discuss the issue. In the end, by a vote of 6 to 2 with one absten­
tion, the council passed a modified resolution that did not endorse a specific plan for 
reform but enumerated the principles we felt should be addressed through reform — of 
access, cost, universality, and quality among others. However, with the business com­
munity smarting from this action, it reverberated over time and was often used to illus­
trate our insensitivity to business.
The business community, notably through the Greater Hartford Chamber of Com­
merce, tended to deal with only a few of the council members who were most disposed 
to concur with business’s positions. An offshoot of the chamber, the Downtown Council, 
developed its agenda of issues for the city and enlisted two members to participate in
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the body and take its agenda back to the city council. Moreover, despite the fact that city 
manager Howard Stanback was extremely skilled in the field of economic development 
and had extensive experience in working with the private sector — for example, over­
seeing a multimillion-dollar expansion of O’Hare Airport while serving as Chicago’s 
commissioner of aviation — the impression of a regime unfriendly to business persisted. 
This issue culminated in a speech delivered by Ronald Compton, CEO of Aetna, to the 
Chamber of Commerce during the 1993 primary campaign season in which he lambast­
ed City Hall leadership for its unfriendly attitude toward the corporate sector. This 
speech was referred to continuously by our opponents in the campaigns. On the election 
of Michael Peters, Compton convened a round table of elected officials — the newly 
elected mayor, several incumbent state legislators, and reelected and newly elected 
council members ■— business leaders, and several community leaders to begin a new 
type of dialogue. In a similar forum held during the fall of 1994, Compton declared that 
City Hall was now a hospitable place for business.
Mistrust by the business community was based on council specific actions and indi­
vidual council members’ support of agendas viewed as antagonistic to business goals. I, 
having extensive ties to the labor movement, was often approached by unions for assis­
tance on their issues. During several local strikes, the council took actions such as 
ensuring that the conduct of police on picket lines was fair to strikers; allowing warming 
trailers within the city’s right-of-way near strike sites; pressuring companies through 
council resolutions and appeals by the mayor’s office; assessing companies for the cost 
of police overtime at strikes in which companies’ unfair labor practices were document­
ed; and three council members participating in a strike-related civil disobedience action 
on one Martin Luther King birthday. I also worked with labor activists to craft an ordi­
nance that established a workplace rights commission whose role was to be as a monitor 
of city economic development activity vis-à-vis the nature of the job creation and labor 
relations fostered by city economic development. These actions made the business com­
munity uncomfortable with the actions of the council and with me in particular when 
fairness to workers emerged as a theme. We maintained that workplace fairness did not 
have to be construed as antibusiness.
Public Perceptions o f and Participation in the Coalition’s Efforts 
The 1991-1993 Hartford city government was a highly public and highly publicly scru­
tinized one. We attempted to involve a wide variety of constituencies in city issues, 
develop new means of hearing the public and new methods of participation. The results 
of our efforts were sometimes characterized as creating an unruly atmosphere in meet­
ings that went on too long. It seemed to some of us that we could rely on the Hartford 
Courant to construe anything it could as either a scandal or evidence of our incompe­
tence or hostility to business. Yet we were able to fashion some very innovative ap­
proaches to governance.
Hostility o f the Local Media. It is extremely difficult to convey the magnitude of the 
local media’s influence over the popular perception of our tenure in office. The city’s 
one daily newspaper, the Hartford Courant, functions as a key ideological outlet and 
source of information for the entire state of Connecticut. Its executive officers play an 
important role in many organizations throughout the state and in Hartford — for exam­
ple, the Downtown Council — and the tenor of the editorials and news reporting has a 
far-reaching effect on the public’s perceptions of officeholders. The Courant was unen­
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thusiastic about the election results — it had often endorsed Perry’s opponents in previ­
ous primaries and general elections. During the two years, it carried many critical 
editorials on issues ranging from the health care resolution to the enactment of an anti­
apartheid selective purchasing ordinance to the handling of city projects, council ap­
pointments, and more. The City Hall reporters were particularly adept at orchestrating 
issues that portrayed the mayor and her council supporters as radical, inept, corrupt, 
antibusiness, and so forth, negatively. Yet they downplayed or minimized her opponents’ 
comparable issues. Two columnists hammered the mayor continually and often gratu­
itously, inserting a jibe about her in a topic unrelated to City Hall or her actions. The 
council was characterized as beset by bickering. Quotations attributed to council mem­
bers were often construed for sensationalist touches in the stories.
There were few outlets for countering the Courant or offering a different perspective. 
Three English-language weekly community papers, one Spanish-language semimonthly 
community paper, and one so-called alternative weekly, an arts-oriented paper, com­
mented on city events with more varied perspectives, but they also exhibited the divi­
sions of the community in some of their coverage. Two African-American-oriented 
newspapers provided coverage generally less hostile to Perry and Stanback’s efforts and 
those of their supporters. One paper, distributed citywide, but primarily oriented toward 
the prevailing politics in the South End, provided mixed coverage, but often was critical 
of either Mayor Perry or her council supporters. The Spanish-language paper alternated 
between supporting the coalition’s efforts and offering stories more critical of the Perry 
group after the council split occurred.
The broadcast media, notably the local affiliates of major television networks, did not 
devote as much time in their newscasts to details of City Hall activities, but frequently 
portrayed their most circuslike aspects on the nightly local news. The local radio talk 
show hosts had a field day with the events. One former such host had previously been a 
police officer in Pennsylvania, and when the local police union clashed with the mayor 
over the issue of establishing a police civilian review board, he presided over a daily, 
constant barrage on his show. For reasons never fully disclosed to the public, he was 
eventually dismissed from his position, then hired briefly as a lobbyist by the Hartford 
Police Union.
Participatory Opportunities and Mechanisms. From 1991 to 1993, hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of people came in and out of the building: lobbying, demonstrating, working 
with council members, the mayor, or city manager on various projects. Since the format 
of the twice-monthly council meetings is fairly rigid and offers no opportunity for pub­
lic participation during the discussions, we decided to precede the meetings with open 
forums in which the public could comment on issues before the body. Council meetings 
formally begin at 8:00 P.M., so we scheduled the public session at 7:30 before the meet­
ing. That portion sometimes lasted until after 9:00 P.M. as many individuals and organi­
zations raised their concerns. It was the first time such a practice had been instituted; 
previously, only ad hoc demonstrations to defy conventional processes provided such 
opportunities.
The Hartford Courant was critical of this innovation, complaining that too much of a 
circus atmosphere was created at the meetings. Some council members were also dis­
dainful of the sessions, particularly when they were publicly disparaged. All of us took 
our share of disapproval during the two years of these forums. Yet for Perry and her 
supporters this new avenue for public input became a symbol of an important direction
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for government, and we felt that the press’s opposition to these sessions represented an 
undemocratic -impulse.
We attempted other, more substantive methods of increasing participation to address 
needs. The city manager’s office developed the concept of targeted neighborhoods for 
city services.21 Initially four neighborhoods, each with pressing but distinct needs, were 
selected. Local community organizations were brought together in these neighborhoods 
and either the city manager or a deputy city manager worked with each of the groups to 
identify municipal service needs and public-private partnerships that could be developed 
for each area. Community-based organizations had to agree to put aside their own dif­
ferences and work together. The plan was for a coordinated set of services to be deliv­
ered in each neighborhood: combined intake procedures for city social service, employ­
ment, and health programs; collaboration between the local schools, the city, and the 
community-based organizations. Community policing was to augment the collaboration. 
Some services were to be subcontracted to the community groups. Local hospitals, col­
leges, and other institutions were to be brought into the mix in new ways.
Many of these efforts were beginning to take more concrete form toward the end of 
our term of office. Some initiatives proceeded more quickly than others, and some of 
the collaboration lives on after the departure of Howard Stanback.
New forms of citizen participation included better utilization of city commissions.
We created several new bodies during our tenure — the Workplace Rights Commission 
noted above, commissions on gay, lesbian, and bisexual issues and on ethnic diversity 
— and envisioned their role as providing input to city government on their respective 
issues. We also relied on advisory groups and existing commissions. As chairperson of 
the Affirmative Action, Employment, Health, and Social Services Committee, I met with 
and sought input from more than half a dozen commissions and advisory bodies in 
devising city policy. It was both energizing and very useful to have these groups avail­
able because I felt that I had simply been thrust into the middle of a number of issues, 
so the guidance of interested parties was important.
Incorporation of Newly Emerging Constituencies and New Methods of Incorporating 
Constituencies. The establishment of the Commissions on Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual 
Issues and the Commission on Workplace Rights, as well as other activities undertaken 
to address the needs of various populations, represent not only new mechanisms for 
participation, but the political development and incorporation of constituencies in new 
and different ways. Constituencies considered either peripheral or on the wane in influ­
ence were able to insert themselves into municipal political processes with high degrees 
of success.
Intensive political organization on the part of the Hartford gay and lesbian com­
munity over the recent past, and especially as a key component within People for 
Change, meant that their political presence had to be taken seriously and their needs 
and demands met by City Hall. During our tenure, we passed the Domestic Partnership 
Ordinance, establishing a process for registration and recognition of domestic partner­
ships, both same-sex and opposite-sex unions, but not extending health benefits to 
domestic partners of city employees. The latter provision was agreed to by commis­
sion members as a compromise in answer to criticism that a financially stressed city 
could not afford to provide this benefit, a key argument offered by opponents of the 
entire plan. The domestic partnership issue evoked the wrath of conservative religious 
forces in the city.
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Within People for Change, labor was not regarded simply as an interest group to 
approach during elections for endorsements, money, and poll workers, but as a key con­
stituency whose needs government should attempt to facilitate. This would be at least 
one way to balance the general access and power that corporate interests exert in influ­
encing government policy and decisions. It goes beyond the conventional views about 
construction unions and their involvement in the growth machine” — often the begin­
ning and end of a discussion of labor in urban politics — leading to a more fundamental 
view of labor as a force for industrial democracy and social change.23 Labor’s needs in 
strikes, organizing, and other activities were taken seriously as issues in which govern­
ment could be called upon to intervene with positive results for unions.
Activism and Advocacy: One key feature of local government during these years was 
active involvement in a variety of equity-oriented issues and advocacy on behalf of 
community residents. Whether in the arena of welfare, employment training, housing, 
recreation, health services or other municipal goods and services, the orientation was 
that government could and should be called upon to play an advocacy role. Moreover, 
the role should be strongly redistributive and accrue benefits to local constituencies. 
These include the utilization of local businesses, contractors, and firms, the protection of 
benefit levels for recipients of public assistance, housing initiatives that emphasize 
urban homesteading and home ownership opportunities, and recreational activities 
geared toward equalizing provision of services across different neighborhoods.
I devoted considerable effort to the city health department’s AIDS programs and the 
facilitation of a local needle exchange program in collaboration with several community 
organizations. When problems developed in obtaining required insurance for the com­
munity organizations, we decided that the city should extend its own insurance to pro­
vide the necessary coverage, a controversial move to the career city bureaucrats. Later, 
when bureaucratic bungling by the health department resulted in the loss of state fund­
ing for certain AIDS activities, we developed a community advisory committee of AIDS 
organizations both to advise the health department and to hold it accountable. The com­
mittee, which still meets, was successful in leading a campaign to restore AIDS pro­
grams slated for elimination to the budget during the 1994—1995 deliberations of the 
succeeding council.
In these matters, our orientation was that government could and should play an active 
role in social advocacy: several officeholders who succeeded us have vastly different 
orientations that would perhaps allow such projects to falter or die without city interven­
tion. Not unexpectedly, they believe city intervention should foster business develop­
ment as opposed to fostering social services.21
Preservation o f Municipal Services. One additional area involves our approach to bud­
get decisions and our desire to preserve the level and scope of services provided by the 
local government to the greatest extent possible. As mentioned previously, the operating 
budgets we considered ranged between S430 million and S440 million; and Hartford has 
faced budget crises for several years. During the first year of our term, the city faced a 
S17 million budget deficit; the second year it was S30 million. Property taxes were 
already extremely high, and there was no serious consideration to raising them. Layoffs, 
union concessions, and other measures whose burden fell heavily on municipal employ­
ees were abhorrent to me, to most of the council members, and to the mayor.
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In 1992 layoffs were avoided by a number of the bargaining units agreeing to copay­
ment plans in their insurance combined with hiring freezes and other cost containment 
measures. In 1993 we looked under every rock and at every possible method of saving. 
Besides additional hiring freezes, reorganization, reduced contractual recreation ser­
vices, we considered a host of other cost containment strategies. We adopted an early 
retirement plan for city employees, which came under intense criticism by the press and 
by Nicholas Carbone — by then director of a legislative think tank on municipal issues 
— but allowed for minimal layoffs.
One strategy we resisted, which has been the hallmark of the succeeding city govern­
ment, is a move toward privatization, a strategy eagerly embraced by the current board 
of education — the first such entity in the country to privatize the management of the 
entire school system — but also championed by the succeeding mayor and city council 
majority. Several members of the 1991-1993 city council on both sides of the five-four 
divide had ties to organized labor and were philosophically inclined against privatiza­
tion, so such measures were not considered seriously. There was general consensus that 
cheaper, privatized services were not adequate answers to Hartford’s problems as com­
pared to regionalization and state-level solutions to the fiscal problems of central cities.
Other Positive Accomplishments
Despite the formidable obstacles and disappointments suffered by those of us who want­
ed a progressive coalition to succeed, several more accomplishments consistent with 
progressive orientations were achieved. Both affirmative action and economic develop­
ment efforts can be mentioned. Some have withstood the transition to the next regime, 
while others have been erased since December 1993.
Affirmative Action. As in other cities that elect African-American mayors, one of the 
key improvements during our administration was gains in affirmative action among 
the leadership of the city workforce. First, the composition of the city council itself was 
for the first time more balanced and reflected the city’s population: three African- 
Americans, three Puerto Ricans, and three whites; five women and four men. Three of 
us were full-time public-sector employees and public-sector union members. Hartford 
had an African-American female mayor, an African-American city manager, a Puerto 
Rican corporation counsel. Moreover, during his tenure, Stanback appointed a number 
of people of color as key department heads, including the city’s first African-American 
police chief and first African-American fire chief. He named Puerto Ricans and African- 
Americans as heads of a number of departments, as well as deputy city manager and 
other important administrative posts. Many of Stanback’s appointees have since been 
replaced.
Reorganization for Economic Development. Within city government, reorganization 
was accomplished to combine and unify the various economic development functions. 
Work was done to create more collaboration across departments and a greater preference 
for customer service among the staff.25 Housing, planning, redevelopment, and business 
retention departments were placed in one new division, Community and Economic 
Development, to maximize collaboration. Efforts were undertaken to develop closer ties 
to area higher education institutions for consultation on business development. Some 
of this has been unassembled since our leaving office, but many of the initiatives will 
certainly benefit our successors.
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Construction Projects as Economic Development. A vital thrust in economic develop­
ment was to ensure that opportunities were being created for local and minority busi­
nesses. A model used with partial success on a school renovation project in Hartford 
offers an interesting method for maximizing minority business participation in munici­
pal projects served as a pilot program for a larger school construction project. The mil­
lions of new construction dollars in the pipeline generated demands for inclusion of 
minority contractors and minority construction trade entrepreneurs in the project. 
Stanback had employed a similar model in the O’Hare Airport expansion projects in 
which the construction was broken down into small jobs for which minority contractors 
could bid and more easily obtain the financial guarantees necessary to participate in 
such endeavors. Instead of using a general contractor, the city would retain the services 
of a construction manager, a private firm that would act as the city’s agent and attempt 
to carry out social goals such as affirmative action and minority business participation in 
the selection of companies to be involved in the project. Larger contracting firms had 
the capacity to bid on jobs either as general contractor or construction manager. The 
construction manager would be responsible for working with the city and devising bid 
packages that would lend themselves to the inclusion of small, minority businesses.
The project became embroiled in the incessant political maneuvering that takes place 
within the council. A selection panel that included four council members — serendipi- 
tously three from the minority caucus — and several city and school board employees 
initially selected a firm for construction manager whose proposal included a partnership 
with another firm experienced in the development of financial assistance to minority 
businesses in the areas of bonding and finance. This plan would be useful in achieving 
the goal of maximum participation of minority businesses that would be urged to 
employ and train local residents in need of employment. In an unusual insertion of itself 
into the affairs of the city manager’s office, the council majority rejected the city man­
ager’s formal resolution to the council to hire the selection panel's choice and another 
company, approved by the majority, was selected. That company faltered badly in 
attempting to manage the project and was finally released. Stanback, whose expertise 
would have been required to make the effort work, left the city manager’s office in 
December 1993; the building trades had put up obstacles to the minority firm goals; and 
the renovation fell more than a year behind schedule.
A Clash of Priorities
Adolph Reed urges an examination of whether a “black regime maximizes the options 
open to it, within its limited sphere, to press the interests of the rank-and-file black 
constituency” rather than capitulate to the progrowth corporate agenda that has gener­
ated a marginalized urban poor.26 Experiences in Hartford reveal the response on the 
part of a highly organized corporate sector to attempts at progressive governance to 
pursue these goals. Utilizing Paul Peterson’s categories of the policies undertaken by 
municipal government — developmental, aliocational, and redistributional — the 
critical dimension of the fight over city hall in a city such as Hartford in this period is 
the conflict between the redistributional needs of those who remain in central cities 
and the developmental needs of those who amass profits in cities.27 At times, public offi­
cials who seek to address these two sets of needs can coexist in local legislative and 
administrative bodies. But when redistributional issues are seen as too costly or a per­
ception develops that officeholders are going too far, as I believe was the case with
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Hartford’s corporate sector during 1991-1993, and with buttressing by traditional 
political rivals, there is hardly space for a progressive regime to succeed or even to 
attempt to succeed. In Hartford, government capacity is so severely strained that even 
allocational issues — public safety, sanitation service, parks, and so forth — took on 
a redistributional dimension.
Using Martin Shelter’s imperatives of local officeholders, even the successes of 
generating sufficient votes in 1991 and preserving Hartford’s credit rating, which was 
AA in 1993, did not overcome the problem of regulating and containing conflict among 
city residents.28 As we attempted to open up government, greater expectations devel­
oped, more conflict ensued, and more disappointments followed. How conflict was 
fueled, orchestrated, and taken advantage of contributed to our most severe problems, 
lack of unity and unfulfilled expectations.
The urban regime literature primarily considers questions of development as the 
defining element of urban politics, but issues of race, redistribution, social consumption, 
and other areas may need to figure more prominently in the discussion, notably in 
older cities such as Hartford, with political leadership of color, at least insofar as they 
constitute a compelling agenda for urban policymakers. Particularly when the urban 
government undergoes dramatic shifts, vacillating between progressive regimes and 
urban conservatism, the embodied frustrations require deeper analysis. New urban-based 
social movements, identity politics, other embodiments of popular grievance, and a 
backlash to these developments also factor into the urban political terrain and assert 
their presence in the electoral arena.
The Continuing Significance of Race and Its Manipulation
The shift in character from the 1991-1993 City Hall leadership to the 1993-1995 
council majority and mayor could be construed as a rejection of progressive or redistrib­
utive initiatives by the local electorate. However, one could argue that there were 
additional dynamics at play, that the shift was more centrally concerned with race and 
the opportunity for whites to reassert political control. White voters easily grasped 
this possibility, and South End politicians, fortifying the urban political trenches, could 
exploit it.2” Impressions of incumbent officeholders were orchestrated by downtown 
business interests which felt threatened by the thrust of the Perry coalition, aided by the 
Hanford Courant's editorial policy, in a manner that played upon the anxiety of the 
electorate. The racial dimensions of the 1993 election would be paramount, but they 
would not be publicly acknowledged as the issue within the election. Furthermore, 
a split in the Puerto Rican political community produced sufficient support for mayoral 
candidate Michael Peters to gamer an important cushion in his margin of victory and 
also for the Republicans against People for Change.
The fusion slate gained the support of downtown interests not necessarily because 
of a preference for Republican social welfare policies, although certain members of 
that group may have held such beliefs, as much as fear that People for Change and the 
more liberal Democrats would go too far in the redistributional direction, too far in 
their support of labor, and create obstacles for or minimize the corporate agenda. Also, 
the patronage network that existed and fed off of contracts and arrangements with 
City Hall and various other city agencies rightly feared that new arrangements could and 
would be fashioned. We were perceived as a threat by this combination of forces, for 
whom our defeat was important.
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Possibilities for Redistribution
Although some of us were clearly interested in using the electoral arena and local gov­
ernment to pursue a redistributional agenda focusing on impoverished communities 
of color, we were not sufficiently powerful to obstruct the developmental needs of the 
corporate sector if community benefits and fairness to the local workforce could accrue, 
no matter how leftist our personal ideologies. Still, I believe, the corporate interests 
disproportionately feared our agenda and did not fully understand the inherent limits 
that people like me perceived we faced. Even when we tried to accommodate the con­
cerns of business interests on issues of downtown development, job training programs, 
public safety, and other concerns, or when we concurred with the Chamber of Com­
merce on such issues as opposing a proposal for a casino, they were sufficiently discom­
fited to warrant their intense mobilization in opposition to our reelection.
A personal example drove this point home to me. During the spring of 1993 there 
was a possibility of moving the New England Patriots from Boston to Hartford. As an 
alternative to a widely heralded proposal to build a casino in Hartford, the Patriots move 
seemed much more desirable and could defuse casino support. Several of us participated 
in booster campaign activities to bring the football team to Hartford. Having grown up 
in Wisconsin during the Green Bay Packers’ glory years, I appreciated the game and 
thought that professional football was much better for Hartford than casino gambling. 
When I appeared with Mayor Perry at a downtown rally to support the effort, the presi­
dent of the Chamber of Commerce, an important actor in the electoral campaign against 
us, astonished to see me at such an event, said to me, “Who would have thunk [ji'c] it!” 
Perhaps his patronizing comment was his attempt to overcome the social tension of 
sharing the platform with me. After all, I was not hostile to such grand economic devel­
opment schemes in and of themselves, but they had to provide tangible benefits to the 
people of the impoverished neighborhoods, who were my first concern.
The Battle over What?
Since leaving office, I have watched a new governing philosophy emerge in Hartford, 
one of privatization, minimization of local government’s role in solving social problems, 
and true hostility toward the poor and the programs that service their needs. The differ­
ence is stark and, for many of us, frightening. The new regime, particularly its mayor, 
has a brilliant public relations apparatus and overwhelming support from the Hartford 
Courant that downplays the severity of the impact of its policies. Their intent is to 
depopulate the city of its poor by dismantling public housing, razing abandoned housing 
that could be rehabilitated in new configurations, and dismantling supportive social ser­
vices. Whether such strategies are peculiar to Hartford or replicated elsewhere, they 
seem to represent an extreme approach to urban governance, which has been bolstered 
by political shifts in Congress.
Despite all the constraints and contention, there are possibilities, limited to be sure, 
for reform and redistribution at City Hall. Progressive movements, particularly those 
with roots and ties in the communities of color, offer some hope that life in American 
cities can be a little easier, a little less harsh, with a greater degree of popular participa­
tion. Furthermore, the adoption of an advocacy posture by local government, both in 
and of itself and in combination with progressive forces, is another dimension of the 
battle, another political choice for urban officeholders. Serious questions remain as to
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how to ensure that politicians who emanate from these urban social movements remain 
connected to their popular base and how to link these localized movements to a larger, 
more national whole, subjects for much more future speculation. **
Notes
1. See Norman Krumholz and Pierre Clavel, eds.. Reinventing Cities: Equity Planners Tell 
Their Stories (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); Harold Washington and the 
Neighborhoods: Progressive City Government in Chicago, 1983-1987, edited by Pierre 
Clavel and Wim Wiewel (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991); Pierre 
Clavel, The Progressive City (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986); 
Clarence Stone, "Summing Up: Urban Regimes, Development Policy, and Political 
Arrangements," in The Politics of Urban Development, edited by Clarence Stone and 
Heywood Sanders (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987); Clarence Stone, Marion 
Orr, and David Imbroscio, "The Reshaping of Urban Leadership in U.S, Cities: A Regime 
Analysis," in Urban Life in Transition, edited by M. Gottdiener and Chris Pickvance 
(Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1991).
2. Krumholz and Clavel, Reinventing Cities.
3. Wanda Katz-Fishman, Jerome Scott, Ralph C. Gomes, and Robert Newby, "Politics of 
Race and Class in City Hall," in Research in Urban Sociology: Race, Class and Urban 
Change, edited by Jerry Lembcke (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1989).
4. See David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs (Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993).
5. Eric Lipton, "Hartford Still among 10 Poorest Cities in Census Report," Hartford Courant, 
December 10, 1992, sec. C, 1, 11,
6. Peggy McCarthy, "In Hartford, the Best and Worst of Times," New York Times, February 7, 
1988, sec. 11, 1, 14.
7. Hartford Planning Department, "Census Data Release." Mimeographed, 1991.
8. Larry Williams, "A Society Far Apart," Hartford Courant, September 25, 1988, 
sec. A, 1, 15.
9. Ira Katzneison, City Trenches (New York: Pantheon, 1981).
10. Clavel, The Progressive City.
11. See Joan Fitzgerald and Louise Simmons, "From Consumption to Production: Labor 
Participation in Grass-Roots Movements in Pittsburgh and Hartford," Urban Affairs 
Quarterly 26, no. 4 (1991): 512-531; David Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery: Third Parties 
in Two-Party America (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), 230-231; 
Louise Simmons, Organizing in Hard Times: Labor and Neighborhoods in Hartford 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).
12. Bruce Shapiro, "Democratic Gadfly in Connecticut," The Nation, August 30, 1988, 
104-144; Jonathan Rabinovitz, "Proudly Liberal, and Newly Powerful," New York Times, 
September 20, 1994, sec. B, 1,5.
13. Krumholz and Clavel, Reinventing Cities.
14. Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart (New York: Facade Crest, 1959).
15. Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
16. Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine," American Journal of Sociology 82, 
no. 2 (1976): 309-332; see also Stephen Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Stephen Elkin, "State and Market in City 
Politics: Or, The 'Real' Dallas," in Stone and Sanders, The Politics of Urban Development.
17. Adolph Reed, "The Black Urban Regime: Structural Origins and Constraints," in Power, 
Community, and the City, edited by M. P. Smith (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 
1988); Larry Bennett, "Harold Washington and the Black Urban Regime," Urban Affairs 
Quarterly 28, no. 3 (1993): 423-440; see also Manning Marable, "Harold Washington's 
Chicago: Race, Class Conflict, and Political Change," in Lembcke, Research in Urban 
Sociology: Race, Class, and Urban Change.
18. Martin Shefter, Political Crisis, Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of New York City 
(New York: Basic Books, 1985).
115
New England Journal o f Public Policy
19. David Harvey, "Flexible Accumulation through Urbanization," Antipode  19, no. 3 (1987): 
260-286; see also Susan Clarke and Andrew Kirby, "In Search of the Corpse: The 
Mysterious Case of Local Politics," Urban Affairs Quarterly 25, no. 3 (1990): 389-412.
20. See the discussion of neo-Alinsky organizations in Robert Fisher, Let the People Decide 
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984); see also Simmons, Organizing in Hard Times.
21. See interview with Howard Stanback in Krumholz and Clavel, Reinventing Cities.
22. Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine."
23. Robert Kuttner, "Will Unions Organize Again?" Dissent 34 (Winter 1987): 52-62; Robert 
Kuttner, "Unions, Economic Power, and the State," Dissent33 (Winter 1986): 33-44; 
Simmons, Organizing in Hard Times.
24. As an example of how councilman Michael McGary justifies the priorities of the 
Community Development Block Program being shifted away from social services into 
development areas, he wrote in the community paper Hartford News, June 1-8, 1994, 
edition, "Every new social ill, true or exaggerated, immediately becomes a reason for a 
state [s/'c] of studies (by paid consultants), followed by committees (usually made up of 
potential directors) who agree on a program. Soon, the tweed [s/cl ring of social activists 
find funding from a well meaning church, corporation, or foundation. After a year or two, 
so much progress is made that it is time for an application for CDBG funds. . . .
Each and every program sounds laudatory at the outset. Social goals to be met, 'clients' 
to be served, staff well trained, and funding in place. However . . . several years later, 
goals have undergone a metamorphosis of some type, 'clients' usually slip down the 
social-economic scale, staff has changed (never for the better), and cash is always a 
problem."
25. See interview with Howard Stanback in Krumholz and Clavel, Reinventing Cities.
26. Reed, "The Black Urban Regime," 168.
27. Paul Peterson, City Lim its (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
28. Shefter, Political Crisis, Fiscal Crisis.
29. Katznelson, City Trenches.
116
